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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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The Role of Trans-Atlantic Defense Alliances in a Globalizing 
World 
Presenter: Dr. Nayantara Hensel has taught finance and economics at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the US Naval Postgraduate School since 2004 and is a Research Associate for the 
Center for Defense Management Research.  She received her BA (magna cum laude) from Harvard 
University where she was a member of Phi Beta Kappa. She received her MA and PhD from the 
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University in Business Economics (Applied 
Economics). She recently served as the Pentagon Scholar in Residence, attached to the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Prior to joining the faculty at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Hensel 
served as a Senior Manager at Ernst & Young, LLP, and as the chief economist for one of its units, was a 
Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research, taught at Harvard 
University and the Stern School of Business at NYU, and was an economist at NERA (part of Marsh & 
McLennan). Hensel’s recent research has examined the impact of consolidation in the defense industrial 
base, policy concerns in the recent tanker competition between Boeing and Northrop Grumman/EADS, 
the factors impacting personal discount rates for US Marine Corps personnel, the efficiency of IPO 
auctions, and economies of scale and density in the European and Japanese banking sectors. She has 
published over 19 articles and book chapters. Her most recent publications have been in Business 
Economics, the International Journal of Managerial Finance, the Review of Financial Economics, the 
European Financial Management Journal, the Journal of Financial Transformation, and Harvard Business 
School Working Knowledge.  She is the Chair of the Financial Roundtable for the National Association of 
Business Economists (NABE) and is one of 34 elected members to NBEIC, which is a group composed of 
the top corporate economists in the US. Hensel has given seminars at a number of institutions and has 




The purpose of this analysis is to discuss the importance of linkages between US and 
European defense manufacturers with the emergence of the common global threat of terrorism, 
the greater price sensitivity of governments concerning weapons systems costs, and the 
shrinkage of defense budgets. The article discusses the reasons behind the formation of 
alliances between US and European defense contractors, examines several case studies of 
alliances, assesses some of the patterns in alliance formation, and analyzes the potential for 
trans-Atlantic alliances between defense contractors in the future. 
I. Introduction 
The landscape of the global defense industry in the post-Cold War period has changed 
in a number of ways. First, the emergence of the terrorist threat has transcended the boundaries 
of nation-states and has led to the emergence of allied forces requiring interoperability of 
equipment and synergistic compatibility in computer systems. Cooperation in research, 
development, and technology transfer between defense contractors from various countries is 
important to produce the best product at the lowest cost. Second, the defense spending gap 
between Europe and the US continues such that the US remains a lucrative market for both 
European and US defense contractors. Third, the US defense industry experienced significant 
consolidation during the 1990s, which, in turn, contributed to greater consolidation among 
European defense contractors to remain competitive globally. This has limited the number of 
possible partners for additional mergers or alliances on both sides of the Atlantic. Fourth, as 
weapons systems become increasingly complex, it can be cost-effective to spread the research 
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across industries and greater collaboration between companies in different countries has 
accelerated over the past twenty years.  
Against this backdrop, there have been a number of studies across industries on 
mergers, as well as on alliances. Mergers have the benefit of leading to the formation of more 
permanent relationships between the merging companies. With the absorption of one company 
into another, there are greater opportunities for cost-cutting in eliminating duplicative workforces 
and in reorganizing the corporate hierarchy to better internalize and reduce the transactions 
costs that would have been present in an arm’s-length relationship. The benefits of this 
absorption can also lead to substantive integration costs and cultural/communication difficulties, 
which can postpone or altogether eliminate the benefits of the merger. Mergers can have 
permanent or long-lasting effects on the market power of various companies, the ability of new 
firms to enter the industry, and market concentration levels. As a consequence, the regulatory 
scrutiny from the antitrust authorities is important in concluding the deal.  
When mergers occur between companies from different countries, the magnitude of the 
opportunities for benefits relative to the costs changes. Absorption costs for an international 
merger can increase relative to a domestic merger, especially if there are cultural or 
communication incompatibilities between the merging parties. The issue of which country loses 
jobs to the other country is often magnified by the popular press and government officials. 
Although the impact on market power and market concentration may be less with an 
international merger than a domestic merger because the definition of the relevant market is 
geographically larger, the regulatory review process can become more complicated since 
regulatory authorities from multiple countries are involved.      
Alliances can often be a good alternative to mergers. The parties involved in the alliance 
can obtain some of the benefits of a merger—joint investments in R&D expenses and 
production equipment, knowledge transfer and technology transfer, and access to new markets. 
Alliances can be easier to disassemble than mergers because less integration of operations is 
required. As a result, integration costs are lower, and the potential for cultural or communication 
clashes is less. Nevertheless, as discussed by Doz and Hamel (1998), in alliances in which 
generation of economies of scale is a motivation, the costs of exiting the alliance can be high 
due to the sunk costs of investment in equipment. Since alliances may lack the depth of 
integration found in mergers, there could be less of an incentive for parties to invest in 
relationship-specific assets and to produce the types of benefits and efficiencies that would be 
possible in a merger. Finally, although alliances may raise fewer regulatory concerns, the 
degree of technology transfer, etc., is still subject to review. Government officials can also 
protest ensuing job loss if combined production facilities from the alliance result in a loss of jobs 
in one country.  
Alliances have become increasingly prevalent in a variety of industries; indeed, a 
number of studies on alliances have been cross-sectional, rather than focused on a specific 
industry, such as Yoshino and Rangan (1995) and Liedtka (1998). The importance of global 
competition as an impetus for alliance formation is discussed in Yoshino and Rangan (1995). 
Strategic alliances can even be a defensive strategy in that, as Gomez-Casseres (1994) 
discussed, as more alliances are formed, there are fewer possible partners available for firms 
that wish to form new alliances, and “strategic gridlock” can develop.  
Alliances are helpful in the defense industry for several reasons. First, the R&D costs for 
development of a product can be high, which is why it is more cost-effective not to duplicate 
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Collaboration between companies can be more cost-effective and successful than the 
competition between many different companies to chase a few contracts. Third, firms benefit 
from each other’s skills without paying the integration costs and financial costs of a merger, 
which can lead to a higher return on investment from the collaboration because the costs of the 
investment are lower. This study analyzes the reasons behind the formation of alliances 
between US and European defense contractors, examines several case studies of alliances, 
assesses some of the patterns in alliance formation, and discusses the potential for trans-
Atlantic alliances in the future. 
II. Motivations for Trans-Atlantic Ties 
One of the primary reasons for further developing trans-Atlantic ties between US and 
European defense contractors was the need for more synergistic and interoperable equipment 
among NATO members. In 1999, Alfred G. Volkman, US Acting Deputy Under Secretary for 
Defense, noted: 
The end of the Cold War, the break-up of the Soviet empire, the emerging power of 
rogue nations, and equally destabilizing geopolitical events are transforming our vision of 
the 21st century security needs and our NATO military strategy […]. In order to develop 
and field interoperable equipment, it is necessary that stronger transatlantic ties are 
forged […]. Governments would agree on common [military] requirements, then invite 
defense firms to form transatlantic competitive teams of their own choosing. (Sparaco, 
1999)  
Nevertheless, concerns over limitations on technology transfer on national security 
grounds between countries was one of the greatest stumbling blocks in strengthening trans-
Atlantic ties. Indeed, in 1999,General Jean-Yves Helmer, Director of the DGA French 
armaments agency, noted, “the US and Europe do not share identical [defense] concepts and 
[operational] requirements. Nevertheless, there is ample room for synergy, on the condition 
that know-how and technology can circulate freely” (Sparaco, 1999, emphasis added). Barriers 
on export licensing and the transfer of technology limited the development of trans-Atlantic 
alliances in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but the “Declaration of Principles” signed by the US 
and the UK in February 2000 was an early step to greater joint research and development, and 
coordination of technology transfer, military requirements, etc. (Sparaco, 2000). Some argued, 
however, that with the exception of the UK and Canada, the US had a lack of trust for most 
other countries, especially in terms of technology-transfer issues (Barrie & Taverna, 2002).  
European defense firms were also attracted to the US market because its defense 
market was much larger than the defense market in Europe. For example, in 2002, the US 
budget was three times that of EU countries. As a result, the investments of European 
companies in the US were 10 times greater than the value of US acquisitions in the European 
defense sector. In some sub-sectors of the defense market, the gap in spending and trade 
between the US and Europe was less. For example, Raytheon argued that in the areas on 
which the Thales Raytheon Systems focused—battlefield surveillance and command and 
control (C2) systems—there was less of a differential in spending (Barrie & Taverna, 2002). 
Consequently, the interest of the Europeans in the US defense market was driven both by 
disparities in spending, as well as by the perception that US R&D might drive the next 
generation of weapons systems—such that an alliance would give European countries access 
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III. Historical Concerns over International Merger Activity 
Involving the US Defense Sector 
Mergers or acquisitions involving the US defense market have historically been 
problematic. Although there may have been benefits from the acquisition, Congressional 
representatives are often concerned about job loss, as well as the national security issues 
inherent in technology transfer. As discussed in Hensel (2008), the acquisition is often formally 
disallowed, or the foreign entrant withdraws its bid in anticipation that the acquisition will be 
blocked if it proceeds further.   
Hensel (2008) discusses, as an example, the concerns over the acquisition of Fairchild 
Semiconductors by Fujitsu, a Japanese firm, in the US semiconductor industry in the 1980s. 
Fujitsu announced that it planned to purchase 80% of Fairchild Semiconductors, which was the 
second largest seller of chips to the US military. The US semiconductor industry was important 
for early warning, air-defense, and air-to-surface attack systems, naval surface warfare, tanks, 
and conventional artillery. Between 1978 and 1987, Japan had increased its share of the 
semiconductor industry from 28% to 50%, while the share of the US in semiconductors had 
fallen from 55% to 44%. For particular types of chips, such as DRAM chips, the share of US 
companies fell from 90% in 1975 to 5% by 1986. A Congressional outcry ensued following 
Fujitsu’s proposal. Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio argued that jobs would be lost, while 
B. Jay Cooper, the press secretary for the Department of Commerce, argued that the deal 
would place “vital national interests at stake.” Several proposals were suggested, including a 
proposal that the merged firm would not be allowed to have military contracts and a proposal 
that Fairchild would not provide Fujitsu with military technology. The outcome of the protests 
was that, in March, 1987, Fujitsu withdrew its offer, and National Semiconductor bought 
Fairchild and became the sixth largest chipmaker in the world (Dallmeyer, 1987). 
Hensel (2008) discusses a more recent example of a failed attempt at entering the US 
market that occurred in 2005 in the US oil sector. As in the semiconductor case, the foreign 
acquirer withdrew its offer due to a substantive Congressional outcry. China National Overseas 
Oil Corporation  (CNOOC), a Chinese state-owned company, tendered a bid to purchase 
Unocal Corp for $18.5 billion. Chevron, the other bidder, was offering only $17.1 billion, but it 
mobilized Congressional representatives to express their concerns about a Chinese firm playing 
a significant role in the US oil sector. In the wake of this outcry, CNOOC withdrew its bid even 
before the CFIUS review, and Chevron acquired Unocal (Shearer, 2006). 
Hensel (2008) notes that concerns over national security can lead to some form of 
separation or divestiture of operating units linked to the defense sector so that the rest of the 
acquisition can proceed. One recent example, discussed in her article, is the merger of Alcatel 
(a French firm) and Lucent Technologies. Since Bell Labs, a division of Lucent, had undertaken 
a number of projects for the US government, Bell Labs would be insulated from the new firm 
and would become a separate US subsidiary with an independent board. A second example, 
discussed in her article, was the concern over the acquisition of Peninsula & Orient Steam 
Navigation, Co. (P&O), a British firm, by the state-owned Dubai Ports Worldwide (DPW). This 
acquisition provoked a Congressional outcry because it would have resulted in a foreign 
company managing 6 US ports. DPW agreed to sell the ports to a US company in the wake of 
strong Congressional opposition (Lynch, 2006; “Buy America,” 2006; Shearer, 2006).  
Hensel (2008), however, describes how the US is not the only country which uses 
protectionism to block mergers. For example, Dominique de Villepin, who served as the French 
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blocked the merger of PepsiCo (US) and Danone (French) under “economic patriotism.” He 
further encouraged the merger of Gaz de France (a French gas supplier with significant state 
involvement) with Suez (a French power and water supplier) at the expense of a bid by the 
Italian company Enel. Similarly, Italy has blocked foreign takeovers of many of its banks 
(Pearlstein, 2006; Platt, 2006; Beattie, 2008). As globalization exposes vulnerabilities, countries 
will likely continue to promote domestic champions by preventing foreign acquisitions through 
protectionist concerns linked to national security. 
IV. Patterns in Alliances between US Defense Contractors and 
Foreign Defense Contractors 
Alliances between US defense firms and foreign firms are also exposed to some of the 
same concerns as mergers—such as concerns over the potential of US jobs going overseas 
and national security concerns over technology transfer. Nevertheless, although alliances 
undergo some scrutiny, it can be easier for the parties involved in the alliance to limit the degree 
of their involvement with each other, at least initially, than would be the case in a merger. As the 
alliance deepens and trust is built—both between the two parties concerned and between the 
two governments involved in the alliance—the degree of involvement can increase.    
Butler, Kenny, and Anchor (2000) discuss strategic alliances within the European 
defense industry, as well as many of the changes to the defense sector. They describe how 
certain defense sub-sectors have more alliances than others and note that the electronics 
sector, the land vehicles sector, and the naval vessel sector have more alliances than the small 
arms and ordnance sector. Although they do not discuss why this might be the case, one 
possibility is that the sectors with more alliances are more R&D-intensive, and it is more cost-
effective for the partners to share the costs than to bear the costs alone. They also discuss how 
cultural compatibility has not been necessary for the success of defense alliances, although 
70% of UK contractors are in an alliance with a US firm. They find that many of the alliances are 
actually agreements for sub-contracting (in which the US firm is the lead contractor), or licensing 
agreements (in which the US firm is the licenser).  
The author collected data on the number, type and details of joint ventures and alliances 
between 2002 and 2005 involving US defense contractors with both other US defense 
contractors, as well as foreign defense contractors. Her analysis of the data found that 
Lockheed Martin and Boeing had the greatest number of alliances with foreign defense 
contractors. Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, and Raytheon had between 1/4 and 1/3 of 
the number of alliances with foreign contractors as Lockheed Martin and between 1/2 and 1/3 of 
the number of alliances with foreign contractors as Boeing. The fact that Boeing and Lockheed 
Martin had more alliances with foreign defense contractors during this period than other large 
US defense contractors may be a function of: (a) the opportunities for shared R&D in the 
weapons systems sub-sectors in which these alliances focused, as well as (b) the success of 
previous alliances made by these companies, which made them more likely to be willing to enter 
into additional alliances, thus creating a positive, self-reinforcing cycle.  
In further examining the data, the author divided the foreign defense contractors involved 
in alliances with a US defense contractor by region—Europe, the UK/Australia/Canada, Asia, 
and the Middle East. Lockheed Martin contracted half of its alliances and joint ventures involving 
foreign contractors with UK, Australian and Canadian contractors and the other half with Asian 
contractors. Northrop Grumman contracted 2/3 of its foreign alliances with UK, Australian, and 
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1/2 of its foreign alliances with European contractors and half with UK, Australian, or Canadian 
contractors. Raytheon had 100% of its foreign alliances with European contractors. Boeing had 
1/3 of its foreign alliances with European contractors and 2/3 with Asian contractors. Lockheed 
Martin and Northrop Grumman did not form an alliance with a European contractor at all during 
this period, while Raytheon and Boeing, which did form alliances with European contractors, did 
not form any alliances with UK, Australian, or Canadian contractors over this period. The 
dominance of UK, Australian, Canadian, or European firms as foreign partners in these 
alliances suggests the importance of: (a) common language; (b) geographic proximity; (c) a 
prior history of successful alliances with firms in that country, leading to a positive, self-
reinforcing cycle; and (d) the importance of these partner countries as allies in the Global War 
on Terror and the need for interoperability of equipment, especially in joint operations.   
V. The Role of Alliances in Creating Additional Alliances among 
Competitors: A Case Study of the CFM Alliance and International 
Aero Engines 
Alliances are often formed in order to combine different knowledge pools to create a new 
and superior product. As the market share for this product increases, the competitors in this 
product space may also form alliances to share knowledge and to develop an even better 
product than their allied competitors. The result of this defensive alliance formation can be an 
improved market sector—with several innovative and competing products for the end-user—
developed by multiple competing alliances. The development of the CFM International alliance 
and the International Aero Engine alliance is an example of this.   
CFM International is a joint venture between Snecma, formerly a French state-owned 
enterprise, and General Electric (GE).  The alliance, which is one of the most successful and 
long-lasting alliances in the trans-Atlantic market, was formed in 1974 because GE and Snecma 
intended to leverage their skills developed in the engine market in the defense sector by 
entering the civilian market for engines, which was heavily dominated by Pratt & Whitney at the 
time. One of the initial hurdles was to convince the US government to allow GE to share its 
military technology with Snecma. As of 2007, the engines made by CFM (especially the CFM 56 
engine) could be found in over 50% of the fleet of single-aisle planes with 100 seats or more 
and are often found in Airbus 320s and Boeing 737s. The way in which the alliance was 
structured was that each of the two partners would be involved with the design, production, and 
research of their respective modules/components within the engine. GE and Snecma’s 
relationship has not been based on equity holdings. The two firms split the proceeds from the 
engines in half, based on notional costs, although neither company knows the true costs of its 
partners (“Business: Odd Couple,” 2007). 
During the early 1980s, Pratt & Whitney’s market share began to fall in this product 
space. In 1983, it created an alliance—International Aero Engines (IAE)—with MTU (part of 
Daimler-Benz), Fiat, Rolls-Royce, and Japanese Aero Engines to develop an engine which 
would compete with CFM’s engines (“Business: Odd Couple,” 2007). This product alliance, like 
CFM International, was based around the design of an engine—in this case, the V2500 engine. 
By 1995, CFM International and International Aero Engines controlled 26.6% of the aero 
engine sector. One benefit of the alliances within the civil engine arena has been that, although 
Rolls Royce, Pratt and Whitney, and GE were already involved in the civil engine market, the 
other members of the alliances, such as Snecma, through its development of the CFM56 engine 
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engine as part of the International Aero Engines alliance, were able to enhance and establish 
their positions in this market. The creation of the CFM International alliance allowed Snecma, 
which had manufactured jets for the French military, to use this expertise to enter the civilian 
aero engine market and to build up a significant presence through its development of the 
CFM56 engine. Consequently, by galvanizing Pratt & Whitney and other manufacturers to form 
International Aero Engines, alliance formation facilitated the development of several new 
engines, as well as a vibrant, competitive marketplace for the end-user (Smith, 1997).  
VI. Trans-Atlantic Partnerships as a Means of Promoting National 
Defense Strategy: A Case Study of Trans-Atlantic Cooperation in 
Missile Defense 
In 2002, Boeing entered into separate agreements at the Farnborough Air Show with 
BAE, EADS, and Alenia Spazio to cooperate on ballistic missile defense. The alliance planned 
to be an informational exchange in which Boeing would discuss with its European partners its 
approach to missile defense, and they would discuss the technologies they could incorporate 
into the missiles (Asker, Barrie & Taverna, 2002). Part of the purpose of the agreements was to 
galvanize the interest of European governments in larger ballistic missile defense programs, 
which they thought could be destabilizing, rather than just theater-wide missile defense. It could 
help the US convince the Europeans that larger missile defense programs could also cover 
NATO’s European members and to show the Europeans that there would be jobs involved in it 
(“Business: Hands Across the Sea,” 2002). 
The various European partners in the alliance were chosen due to the contributions that 
their expertise would provide to the project. Alenia Spazio, part of Finnmeccanica, would add its 
expertise in supercomputers/data fusion, synthetic aperture radar satellites, and wideband 
secure telecommunications to the joint missile defense architecture discussions. EADS would 
add expertise in the space area from its affiliate, Astrium, as well as its knowledge of early 
warning satellite systems, which could locate the sites where the ballistic missiles were 
launched, the zone of potential impact, and the trajectory of the missile in the boos phase 
(Asker, Barrie & Taverna, 2002).  
Part of the reason why there was an impetus for trans-Atlantic alliances in the missile 
area is that there have been several previous alliances in the missile product area.  
For example, Boeing and EADS had collaborated on a study for NATO on tactical 
missile defenses (Asker, Barrie & Taverna, 2002), and Boeing had worked in marketing the 
Meteor missile, made by EADS and BAE. Most of the previous arrangements between Boeing 
and EADS had involved subcontracting or marketing, while this alliance involved sharing the 
product development responsibilities (“Business: Hands Across the Sea,” 2002).  
Consequently, this alliance was partially motivated by the need to convince the 
Europeans of the US perspective toward larger missile defense programs. It involved sharing of 
knowledge between the members and a fusion of their different capabilities to produce 
innovative products. Alliances, particularly between Boeing and EADS, had previously existed in 
the missile defense arena, and the positive momentum from these previous alliances had 
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VII. Alliances Focused on Specific Product Areas: A Case Study 
on the Alliance between Raytheon and Thales 
Many of the successful trans-Atlantic alliances between defense contractors have been 
focused on a specific product area. CFM International and International Aero Engines, 
discussed in Section V, are examples of successful alliances which concentrated on developing 
systems in a specific product area. Another example of this type of alliance is the alliance 
between Thales (formerly Thomson-CSF, a French company) and Raytheon. This alliance, 
Thales Raytheon Systems, was completed in early 2001. This alliance was created so the two 
contractors could collaborate on ground-based battlefield radar programs and air defense 
command/control (C2) programs (Taverna, 2001). By the end of 2001, Thales and Raytheon 
had collaborated on 17 projects (“US-Euro Strategic Alliances,” 2001). 
The alliance was a horizontal combination in which firewalls were built to protect against 
leakage of sensitive information. Thales Raytheon Systems was divided into two subsidiaries; 
Raytheon would have a 51% share in the US subsidiary, and Thales would have a 51% share in 
the European subsidiary. The revenues of Thales Raytheon Systems were split between France 
and the US (Taverna, 2001). 
As was the case in the alliance formed between Boeing and EADS in the missile 
defense area, Thales Raytheon Systems was formed partially because the two companies 
involved had successfully collaborated on other fronts—thus building trust between the two 
parties and increasing their tendency to invest in relationship-specific assets, despite the more 
arm’s-length nature of an alliance relative to a merger. Thales and Raytheon collaborated on the 
Air Command Systems International (ACSI), which was a venture established in 1997 to work 
on the Florako air defense radar project in Switzerland, and NATO’s Airborne Command and 
Control System (LOC1). ACSI continued to be a separate entity, but was attached to Thales 
Raytheon Systems (Taverna, 2001). 
VIII: The Role of Alliances in Sharing R&D Costs: A Case Study of 
Boeing’s “Super-Jumbo” Jet Alliance 
Mergers and alliances are often valuable in enabling the participating firms to generate 
economies of scale in both R&D costs and in production costs by sharing these costs or by 
spreading them over a greater number of units of output to lower per-unit costs.  As weapons 
systems have become more complex, R&D has continued to be an important and costly phase 
of the product development cycle.  
One example of an alliance which was formed to share R&D costs was an alliance—led 
by Boeing, and including the Airbus companies of Aerospatiale SA (France), British Aerospace, 
and Daimler-Benz—to develop a “super-jumbo” jet. The R&D costs to develop this jet, which 
would have carried between 600 and 800 passengers, were $15 billion. This was too much for 
one contractor to sustain and was more affordable when spread over an alliance of contractors 
(Cole, 1995). 
The project first began development in January 1992, but collapsed in 1995 due to 
uncertainty in demand. Only Singapore Airlines and British Airways were willing to place orders. 
This underscores the importance of the need to share R&D costs, and hence the risk of product 
development, in an environment of uncertain demand. A second reason for the collapse of the 
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development of the next generation of supersonic planes (Cole, 1995). Consequently, although 
alliances are important in sharing R&D costs, the placement of the product being developed has 
to be evaluated in the context of the costs of the estimated future trajectory in product 
development.  
IX. The Role of Alliances in Developing Interoperable Equipment 
between Allied Forces: A Case Study of the Joint Strike Fighter 
The development of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is an example one of the most 
extensive alliances in the defense sector, involving 9 different contractors from various 
countries, led by Lockheed Martin. The JSF not only allows the various contractors to contribute 
their expertise to provide a better product, but also provides a strong basis for understanding 
the challenges facing global defense alliances in the future, ranging from cost-allocation issues, 
to technology transfer security issues, to global supply chain integration issues.    
One of the main benefits of the creation of the JSF is that the new product—created by 
the sharing of technology between the various allied nations—will allow greater synchronization 
of subsequent operations of the coalition of allied countries and the development of more similar 
capabilities. The intention has been for the F-35 to replace 13 different types of aircraft across 
11 different countries (“Lockheed Martin,” 2008). Nine nations are participating in the JSF 
program, according to their levels of financial involvement. While the US is the primary 
customer, the UK is a Level I partner since it contributes 10% of the development costs, 
followed by Level II partners—the Netherlands and Italy, and then followed by Level III 
partners—Canada, Turkey, Australia, Norway, and Denmark (“F-35 Lighting II,” 2009).  
The international structure of the relationships between the US contractors and the 
foreign contractors on the JSF has drawn criticism. By mid-2003, one of the concerns was 
linked to the fact that the foreign contractors on the JSF did not have to share the growing 
development costs, which had already increased $3 billion since the start of the system 
development phase. The US defense representatives argued that they could ask for assistance 
from their foreign allies in handling cost overruns. A second concern, voiced by the chairman of 
the House Government Reform Panel, Representative Shays, was that too many US jobs on 
the JSF were going overseas—as of that point, 18% of the contracts on the JSF had gone 
overseas, valued at $2.2 billion. A third concern came from the partners on the other side of the 
Atlantic: the Chairman of Alenia Aeronautica noted his disappointment in the return on 
investment in the JSF. On the US side, there were concerns that program decisions might have 
to be made to increase the return on investment to partner countries, but which could also lead 
to delays or higher costs (Wall, 2003). Finally, a fifth concern arose surrounding technology-
transfer issues. The UK threatened to exit the JSF program unless the US shared information 
on the stealth technologies, etc., related to the plane (“Politics and Economics,” 2006). Britain 
had invested $2 billion in the plane as of the spring of 2006, when the discussions began about 
their concerns over the US not sharing this technology (“Strains in the Alliance,” 2006). This 
disagreement was subsequently resolved.  
Multinational military operations require a degree of synergy between the technology of 
the various allied powers; compatibility in computer systems and communications systems is 
important. Trans-Atlantic alliances can promote this, not only in the case of the JSF, but for 
subsequent products. The intention of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to purchase more 
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compatible with its allies and that are developed through global alliances, as well as to the high 
quality of the collaboratively produced plane.   
Section X: The Role of Alliances in Entering New Markets: A Case 
Study of the Northrop-Grumman/EADS Alliance on the KC-45a 
Tanker 
One of the most recent chapters in the evolution of trans-Atlantic defense relations has 
been the alliance between Northrop-Grumman and EADS to supply the USAF with a new fleet 
of aerial refueling tankers. This contract may the largest defense contract in history with the 
exception of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. This is a landmark case not only in terms of the size 
of the defense contract, but also in terms of the relationship of the US with the broader 
European defense market, and the impact of the US reaction to the tanker competition on global 
perceptions concerning the openness of the US defense market.  
As discussed in Hensel (2008), the tanker competition is very important to the USAF 
because the average age of the existing KC-135 tankers is 47 years; the planes were first put 
into service in 1957. The 2008 competition was initially over a $1.5 billion contract, covering 4 
test aircraft. The intent was then to buy 175 more planes, for a total value of $35 billion. While 
the $35 billion amount would stretch over 10-15 years, an additional $60 billion in revenue could 
come from maintenance and parts such that the overall contract would be worth $100 billion 
(“Analysts,” 2009; “Northrop group,” 2008; Wolf and Shalal-Esa, 2008; Hinton, 2008).  
Hensel (2008) discusses how, in this competition, Boeing displayed the behavior of a 
traditional incumbent. It had been the provider of refueling tankers to the USAF for almost 50 
years and had what was often referred to as a “ monopoly.” When the Air Force announced that 
the Northrop Grumman/EADS team had won the contract on February 29, 2008, Boeing 
indicated shortly afterward that it was dissatisfied with the decision and lodged a series of 
protests with the GAO about the way in which the competition was conducted. The GAO 
recommended that the competition be reopened and upheld 8 of Boeing’s 100 protests, 
although it stated that it found no evidence of “intentional wrongdoing” by USAF procurement 
officials (Randolph, 2008).  
The USAF announced on July 9 that it would reopen the competition and would focus it 
on the 8 areas of protest sustained by the GAO. Unlike the previous competition, which was 
overseen by the USAF, this competition would be overseen by John Young, the chief of 
weapons procurement and the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics at the Pentagon. The Air Force stated explicitly that in the new competition, it would 
provide extra credit for a larger plane with additional fuel offload capacity (Shalal-Esa, 2008, 
July 9). Boeing, faced with the opportunity to propose the larger 777 in light of this “extra credit” 
suggested in the draft RFP, claimed that it would pull out of the competition if it were not 
provided with more time to develop a modified 777. The USAF decided to cancel the 
competition in the fall of 2008 and to re-open it again in the summer of 2009. The last chapter in 
this story remains to be written.  
The alliance of Northrop-Grumman and EADS to build aerial refueling tankers differed 
from previous trans-Atlantic alliances due to the substantive investment that EADS planned to 
make in the US defense industrial base—both in terms of creating jobs and in terms of building 
production facilities. This was because it wanted to obtain a stronger base within the US to enter 
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pays suppliers in euros, but sells airliners in dollars, so moving production to dollar-zone 
countries was particularly helpful when the euro was strong relative to the dollar. About 60% of 
the Northrop/EADS tanker would be made in the United States. Some of the parts would be 
manufactured in Germany, France, Spain, and Great Britain, but assembly of the tanker would 
have occurred in Mobile, AL, where EADS planned to build the third largest manufacturing 
facility in the world and where it had also planned to assemble a commercial freighter version of 
the A330 (Wolf & Shalal-Esa, 2008).   
Unfortunately, as extensively discussed in Hensel (2008), the Congressional 
representatives from the states which would have benefitted if Boeing had received the contract 
protested strongly that US jobs would be lost under the Northrop/EADS proposal. Despite the 
fact that the Northrop/EADS tanker would create 48,000 jobs in the US, Kansas Representative 
Tiahrt continued to argue that “‘I cannot believe we would create French jobs in place of Kansas 
jobs’” (as cited in Drawbaugh, 2008, February 29). On the other hand, Senator McCain noted, 
‘“I’ve never believed that defense programs should be—that the major reason for them should 
be to create jobs. I’ve always felt that the best thing to do is to create the best weapon system 
we can at cost to taxpayers’” (as cited in Drawbaugh, 2008, March 3). These thoughts were 
echoed in the comments of Pentagon acquisition chief John Young, who noted, ‘“I don’t think 
anybody wants to run the department as a jobs program,”’ further arguing that lawmakers 
usually focused on asking him to reduce the costs of weapons systems (as cited in Shalal-Esa, 
2008, March 4).  
As analyzed in Hensel (2008), the initial award of the contract to the team of 
Northrop/EADS reinforced the perception of many that, as Defense Secretary Robert Gates had 
stated, “‘defense manufacturing is a global business’” (“Northrop Grumman Fires Back,” 2008), 
particularly as the US had allied with many other countries in combating the War on Terror. 
Many perceived this initial award as the harvest of improved relations with France, and that it 
would be much harder for European manufacturers to claim that US markets were closed to 
them. French President Nicholas Sarkozy stated on March 3, 2008, ‘“If Germany and France 
had not shown from the beginning that we were friends and allies of the United States, would it 
have been possible to have such a commercial victory?”’ (as cited in Hepher, 2008).  
Nevertheless, after the GAO handed down its ruling, several European officials expressed 
concerns that this signaled that US markets were not open to European products, despite the 
investment of the European alliance partner in the US defense industrial base. Others 
expressed concerns of retaliation on the part of European manufacturers if Northrop/EADS 
finally loses the contract when the competition is re-opened.  
XI: Conclusion 
The purpose of this analysis is to discuss the importance of linkages between US and 
European defense manufacturers with the emergence of the common global threat of terrorism, 
the greater price sensitivity of governments concerning weapons systems costs, and the 
shrinkage of defense budgets. Due to national security concerns and integration costs, alliances 
can often be easier to develop than mergers and can ultimately provide a prelude to an ultimate 
merger between the parties if the alliance is successful. Alliances can provide many of the 
benefits of mergers, such as sharing R&D costs or allowing access into new markets, without 
many of the costs of mergers: difficulty in exiting, substantive integration costs, etc.  
The case studies in this analysis highlighted the role of trans-Atlantic alliances in 
achieving various outcomes—spurring alliances between competitors to ultimately create a 
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promoting national defense strategies (Boeing’s alliance with EADS and other manufacturers in 
the missile arena), sharing R&D costs (the failed alliance between Boeing and other 
manufacturers to build a “super-jumbo” jet), developing interoperable equipment between allied 
nations (the JSF), and entering new markets (the alliance between Northrop Grumman/EADS to 
supply new aerial refueling tankers).  
The last two cases—the JSF and the tanker competition—will have a significant impact 
on subsequent trans-Atlantic defense alliances. The JSF, because it unites manufacturers from 
9 countries, will break new ground and set new precedents in how issues involving global 
supply chain problems, cost absorption, and technology transfer will be resolved in later trans-
Atlantic alliances. The tanker competition—due to the magnitude of the contract, the size of 
EADS’ proposed investment in the US, and the international publicity that the competition 
achieved from the dialogues of various Congressional representatives and government 
leaders—will affect perceptions about the openness of US markets to foreign manufacturers.  
As countries are increasingly faced with budgetary strains from combating the current 
financial crisis, the fiscal strains imposed by an ageing population, and other areas such as 
education, infrastructure, etc., defense budgets will likely be under more pressure. Moreover, 
there will be a greater emphasis on obtaining innovative weapons systems products at low costs 
and in a timely manner. As supply chain issues are smoothed out, there will be a significant 
opportunity for global alliances in the defense sector to play a valuable role in helping 
governments meet the challenges of the new millennium.  
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